The notion of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa ("purposes of the Sharia") 
Introduction
The term maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa comprises the objectives and purposes behind Islamic rulings. From an Islamic point of view, all Sharia rules and instructions are, generally speaking, predicated on the benefits of the individual and that of the community. They promote people's interest and welfare and protect them from harm. A large number of Islamic legal theoreticians use therefore maṣlaḥat al-khalq ("the interest of human creatures") as a synonym for maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa. 1 The idea of assessing a certain underlying purpose, aim, or intent from Qurʾānic or prophetic instructions goes back to the early period of Islam, indeed to the Companions of the Prophet. They formulated numerous legal decisions in the light of certain aims, whereby they did not use the term maqāṣid directly. Rather, they referred to technical terms such as asrār ("secrets"), ḥikma ("wisdom"), ʿilla ("reason") or maʿānī ash-sharʿ ("meanings of legislation"). 2 It was left for the fifth century legal scholar Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī to establish a well-defined theory of maqāṣid. His theoretical articulation of this legal concept has gained general acceptance ever since.
3 Today, many contemporary Muslim scholars calling for reform and renewal of Islamic legacy and thought often employ maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa for the purposes of their reformist agenda. Based on their notion of maqāṣid, they give new fatwas under the pretext that they protect the common good.
In this sense, they try to broaden the scope of the traditional understanding of maqāṣid. 4 Kamali states in this regard that maqāṣid had been "the focus of renewed interest and attention in recent decades, borne out by the growth of voluminous literature in Arabic on its various themes". 5 The present paper compares two definitions of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa: the first is that of Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) whose contribution on this issue remains influential to this day and shows according to Felicitas Opwis "[…] a highly developed system of legal theory which is more coherent than the thought of previous jurists." 6 The second author is the Egyptian-born Qatari scholar Yūsuf al- Qaraḍāwī (b. 1926) . He is regarded as one of the most influential and preeminent Muslim scholars in the world today. Due to his writings on maqāṣid and his intensive commitment to this theme, he was called as faqīh al-maqāṣid ("jurist/specialist of maqāṣid"). 7 His positions as the chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS) as well as of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) give him popularity and recognition not only among Muslims in the Middle East, but among European Muslims as well. 8 Indeed, the most popular broadcast of al-Jazeera TV channel, ash-Sharīʿa wa-l-Ḥayāt ("Sharia and Life"), helped him to become an influential authority among Muslims worldwide. 9 The purpose of this study is to show how the concept of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa as a classical legal construct developed by medieval as well as pre-modern Islamic legal theoreticians is understood in the contemporary time in meeting the current challenges of the Muslim life. We begin with an overview of maqāṣid with the focus on alGhazālī's contribution. This is followed with an examination of al-Qaraḍāwī's understanding of maqāṣid with reference to common features and differences between him and al-Ghazālī. The primary sources for this study are al-Ghazālī's al-Musṭaṣfā min ʿilm al-uṣūl and al-Qaraḍāwī's books inter alia Dirāsa fī fiqh maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa and Madkhal li-maʿrifat al-islām. 
Maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa
We mentioned that assessing a certain underlying objectives of Sharia rulings can be traced back to the Companions of the Prophet, as transmitted in a number of incidents. A series of examples show the result of taking a purpose-oriented approach to the Qurʾanic or prophetic instructions occurred, for instance, during the caliphate of ʿUmar b. Khattāb, the second caliph (d. 644). For example, during the period of famine in Medina, he suspended the prescribed punishment for theft. He recognized that applying the punishment, while people are in need and often forced to steal food just to survive, goes against the purpose of law, in this case the general principle of justice.
11 Although maqāṣid were at that time obviously relevant for the justification of legal issues and for ijtihād in general, they have not been treated as such in the conventional expositions of the theory of ijtihād. The term maqāṣid was, according to Auda and ar-Raisūnī, first used in the juristic writings of at-Tirmiẓī al-Ḥakīm (d. 908 CE) in his book "aṣ-Ṣalāt wa-maqāṣiduhā" ("Ritual prayer and its purposes"). 4 Auda, Maqāṣid, [13] [14] [15] [16] He also wrote a treatise on the "Pilgrimage and its secrets" (al-Ḥajj wa-asrāruh) . In these writings, he deals with the wisdoms and spiritual purposes behind the daily ritual prayers and the pilgrimage. 12 Another scholar who dealt intensely with the maqāṣid as a juridical concept is Abū Bakr al-Qaffāl ash-Shāshī (d. 975 CE). In his jurisprudential work Maḥāsin ash-sharīʿa ("The Beauties of the Sharia"), he presents Islamic rulings on different issues briefly and elaborates subsequently the aims and purposes of the Sharia behind the rulings. 13 In the introduction of his book, he writes: "[…] I decided to write this book to illustrate the beauties of the revealed Law, its magnanimous and moral content, and its compatibility with sound reason. I will include in it answers for those who are asking questions about the reasons and wisdom behind its rulings." 14 Although a number of prominent jurists and uṣūl scholars continued to contribute to the study of maqāṣid, its theoretical development took place only later in the fifth Islamic century by Imam al-Juwaynī (d. 1085 CE).
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Therefore, ʿAbdallāh b. Bayya, a contemporary Islamic scholar (b. 1935) , associates the fifth Islamic century with "the birth of the philosophy of the Islamic law." 16 Al-Juwaynī, a leading scholar of his time, noted that the Prophet's Companions exhibited a high level of awareness of the objectives of Sharia. He emphasized in his work al-Burhān fī uṣūl al-fiqh that one who does not reflect on the maqāṣid and consider it by responding to all concerns of the society, does not have sufficient knowledge about the Sharia at all. 17 Under his discussion of the legal term qiyās al-ʿilla ("causative inference"), he presents five levels of maqāṣid, necessities (amr ḍarūrī), public needs (ḥāja ʿamma), moral behavior (makruma), recommendations (mandūbāt) and what cannot be attributed to a specific reason such as the way of performing the ritual prayer. 18 Al-Juwaynī's approach was then clarified and developed further by his student, Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī.
Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī's theory of maqāṣid
In two of Ghazali's works on legal theory, Shifāʾ al-ghalīl and al-Mustaṣfa min ʿilm al-uṣūl, he wrote at length on the following legal terms: ratio legis (taʿlīl), public interest (maṣlaḥā) and maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa. 19 He understands the doctrine of maṣlaḥa interchangeably with maqāṣid. He writes: "Maṣlaḥa is, primarily, an expression of bringing about benefit (manfaʿa) or averting harm (maḍarra). Yet, this is not what we mean, […] . Rather, we mean by maṣlaḥa the preservation of the purpose of the law (maqṣūd al-sharʿ)." 20 For him, every Quraʾnic or prophetic instruction God revealed to humankind is aimed at their maṣlaḥa. Following the example of his teacher al-Juwainī, he classified maqāṣid into a hierarchy. But, Ghazālī's hierarchy is slightly different. He speaks of three levels, namely necessities (ḍarūrāt), needs (ḥājiyyāt) and refinements (taḥsīnāt). 21 The first category consists of five objectives, namely those of religion (ad-dīn), life (an-nafs), intellect (al-ʿaql), lineage (an-nasl) and property (al-māl). The preservation of these so called "the fundamental elements of human existence" (aḍ-ḍarūrāt al-khamsa) has a matter of absolute priority. 22 This circle includes the basic and universal necessities on which the lives of people depend.
According to Kamali, these elements must be observed and protected regardless of personal predilections. 23 The second category, ḥājiyyāt, is a reference to what removes restrictions and difficulties from the daily lives of Muslims. More so, it should bring flexibility and facilitation. In addition, it supports the essentials (ḍarūrāt) and is associated with those interests that, if neglected, would bring difficulties and hardship. For example, it is permissible for pregnant woman not to fast if she fears some harm which she thinks will most likely affect her and/or her baby. The third kind, taḥsīnāt, includes such issues and interests that lead to perfection in the moral conduct of people (e.g. eating manners or using perfume).
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In his further discussion, al-Ghazālī distinguishes between three types of maṣāliḥ, public interests, concerning its recognition as based in the Islamic textual sources (the Qurʾān and the Sunna): (1) Accredited public interest, (maṣlaḥa muʿtabara), for which the Quraʾan or the Sunna provide evidence such as the prohibition of wine which preserves the faculty of reason. 25 (2) Nullified public interest (maṣlaḥa mulghāt), which is invalid according to Qurʾānic or prophetic indications. The dealing with interest brings, for example, profit. However, it has been prohibited by both the 3:130, 4:161) and the Sunna.
26 (3) The third category, "unregulated benefit" (maṣlaḥa mursala), includes such public interests about which the revelation texts are silent. The Qurʾān and the Sunna do not support it but neither do they reject it.
27 Formulating a legal opinion belonging to one of the first two categories does not cause any problems, because they are explicitly approved or rejected by textual evidence. However, the last type has given rise to much debate and internal polemic among scholars. Since the understanding of maṣlaḥa mursala is variable, it does need some clarification and precision. Thus, al-Ghazālī sets three preconditions for its application to legitimately serve the public good: An undetermined maṣlaḥa has to be necessary (ḍarūrīya), universal (kullīya) in nature and certain (qaṭʿīya).
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As an example for a valid ruling based on an unattested maṣlaḥa, al-Ghazālī presents the following hypothetical war scenario: Unbelievers shielding themselves with a group of Muslim captives. If the Muslim army would not attack and shoot against the enemy including the Muslims used as human shield, the unbelievers would have an opportunity to advance and conquer more Muslim territory killing all Muslims as well as the prisoners. If, however, the Muslims were to shoot against the enemy, they would also kill innocent Muslims, what the divine texts expressly prohibit. With regard to the conditions of the application of maṣlaḥa mursala, al-Ghazālī argues that it is permissible to shoot at the Muslims used as human shield and kill them, in order to preserve the whole of the Muslim community (here, it is a maṣlaḥa kullīya). He also categorizes this action as necessary (ḍarūra), because it preserves the life of Muslims definitely (qaṭʿī) since it is the only method of saving Muslims from annihilation.
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The conditions al-Ghazālī puts on the application of this aspect of public interest severely limit its use. It makes it practically hard to invoke, since the conditions of necessity, universality, and certainty will be hard to meet.
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Despite the detailed analysis that al-Ghazālī offered, he nevertheless clearly refused to give an independent legitimacy (ḥujjīyah) to maṣāliḥ mursala as an Islamic legal source. He even counts it -beside istiḥsān ("preference") and qaul aṣ-ṣaḥābī ("legal opinions of the Companions of the Prophet") -as one of the "illusionary sources of law" (al-uṣūl al-mauhūmah) .
31 Accordingly, for al-Ghazālī, like for many other legal theoreticians, Islamic rulings should be based on textual indications (adilla) found in the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna. 23 Ibid., 482-483 and Kamlī, Sharīʿah, 132 and idem., "Sources, Nature and Objectives of Shari`ah," in The Islamic Quarterly (1989), 215-35. 24 vol. 2, 485 and Auda, Maqāṣid, 5. 25 However, some legal scholars after al-Ghazālī have completely changed the conditions of the application of maṣlaḥa mursala. The clearest example in this regard can be seen in the approach of the famous fourteenth century Hanbali jurist Najm al-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī (d. 1316).
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By and large, he ended up giving al-maṣlaḥa al-mursala priority over textual evidences from the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna. 33 Based on this notion, many contemporary thinkers make "very strange 'modern Islamic legal decisions'" thinking they protect the people's interest. 34 Be that as it may, al-Ghazālī's conception of maṣlaḥa and maqāṣid remains the basic framework for a number of Islamic jurists dealing with maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa, such as al-ʿIzz b. ʿAbdassalām (d. 1262), Ibn Taimīya (d. 1328) and Tāj ad-Dīn as-Subkī (d. 1369). Referring to his concept, they develop their own interpretations and continue to contribute to maqāṣid. Beside many other jurists, the Mālikī jurist, Shihāb al-Dīn al-Qarāfī (d. 1285), discusses in his treatise of suitability (munāsaba) as an indicant for the ratio legis the three categories of maqāṣid and adds to the list of universals (al-kullīyāt al-khams) a sixth, namely the protection of honor (ʿird).
35 Also the Mālikī scholar ash-Shāṭibī (d. 1388) considerably distinguished himself in this regard from other jurists, especially by his maqāṣid approach in his book alMuwāfaqāt fī uṣūl ash-sharīʿa and in the third volume of his work al-Iʿtiṣām as well. 36 His contribution is considered as the first systematic study on maqāṣid. With regard to his discussion on maṣlaḥa, it is seen as "the culmination of the interpretation of maṣlaḥa in the pre-modern period."
37 Ash-Shāṭibī's treatises on maqāṣid and maṣlaḥa have received keen attention by contemporary scholars and researchers. Masud, al-Raisūnī and Opwis, for example, portray his theory of maṣlaḥa in detail. 38 Al-Qaraḍāwī cites him as well. On this account and in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I here continue with al-Qaraḍāwī's concept of maqāṣid.
Al-Qaraḍāwī's Concept of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa 39

Al-Qaraḍāwī's writings on maqāṣid
Like many other contemporary scholars and thinkers, 40 al-Qaraḍāwī pays keen attention to maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa. This is reflected in many of his writings. For example, in his first and most popular book al-Ḥalāl wa-l-ḥarām fī lislām, he presents the first category of maqāṣid and discusses some of the Islamic legal maxims (qawāʿid fiqhīya) which are closely linked to aḍ-ḍarūrāt. He mentions inter alia: "necessity makes the unlawful lawful" (aḍ-ḍarūrāt tubīḥ al-mahẓūrāt) and "harm must be eliminated" (aḍ-ḍararu yuzāl). 41 In his treatise Naḥwa fiqh muyassar ("Towards a facilitated Islamic Law"), he also presents the consideration of maqāṣid as decisive factor for making Islamic law easy. 42 The importance of maqāṣid in al-Qaraḍāwī's thought can be furthermore found in many of his contributions and theoretical programs. In his writing on the implementation of the Sharia law (taṭbīq ashsharīʿa), he underscores the necessity of taking maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa and the people's interest into account. This enables, according to his understanding, the application of the rulings of Islamic law in the everyday life of Muslims. 43 This notion is founded on his belief that the provisions of the Sharia are valid at all times and in all places. They are, so his argument suggests, absolute and universally applicable, regardless of the time and the place where Muslims live. For him, Islam or Sharia -he uses both synonymously -bear a universal message to all human beings. It takes, therefore, people's interests and their needs into account. 44 Al-Qarḍāwī also represents maqāṣid as a guiding principle for changing of traditional legal opinions. 45 In this context, he precisely requires that Muftis have to have sufficient knowledge of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa to be able to give legal judgments that are suited for the context. An awareness of the high purposes of the Sharia leads scholars, so al-Qaraḍāwī says, to revise previous legal opinions in accordance with the changes of time, place, and situation. He justifies this notion with historical incidents, which shows the consequence of taking the maqāṣid into account: For instance, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb did not feel obliged to do what the Prophet had done in respect of the distribution of newly acquired lands in Sawadā, based on maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa and simply because the situation had been changed. Subsequently, al-Qaraḍāwī warns that Muftis or scholars who do not have enough knowledge about maqāṣid and who do not understand the reasons behind the Sharia rulings may mistakenly contradict either the letter or the spirit of the Sharia law. As a result, an Islamic ruling may even seem to contradict interests in some way and lead people to conclude that the Sharia should either be ignored or changed. Therefore, he considers knowledge of maqāṣid as an "indispensable necessity" (ḍarūra lā-budda minhā).
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By and large, al-Qaraḍāwī mentions the maqāṣid in almost all his writings, particularly in his works on themes such as ijtihād and iftāʾ. He lists ten books in which he treats the question of maqāṣid as a reference for his intensive commitment to this issue. 47 In his treatises, Madkhal li-dirāsat ash-sharīʿa and Dirāsa fī fiqh maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa, he elaborates this topic systematically and considers maqāṣid to be the fundamental core of the Islamic religion and the foundation law. Within the scope of these writings, which obviously include a number of overlaps of topics, he also discusses many other concepts that have been closely linked to maqāṣid such as above mentioned unregulated public interest (al-maṣlaḥa al-mursala) and istiḥsān ("juristic preference"). 48 Al-Qaraḍāwī himself emphasizes his early preoccupation with maqāṣid as follows: "For a long time, I believe in the purposes of Sharia and the necessity of its knowledge and relevance building/educating the mentality of the jurists who want to dive into the seas (biḥār) of the Sharia to bring out its beads (laʾāliʾuhā). It helps the jurists to reach the correct assessment [...] ." 49 Therefore, ar-Raisūn, a contemporary Moroccan scholar, summarizes the consideration for the purposes of Sharia as that which constitutes "the first and fundamental characteristic in Qaraḍāwī's fiqh." 50 However, how does alQaraḍāwī understand the objectives of Sharia in the context of the twenty first century, compared with alGhazālī's definition?
Al-Qaraḍāwī's notion of maqāṣid
Like al-Ghazālī, al-Qaraḍāwī uses the terms maqāṣid and maṣlaḥa interchangeably. He defines maqāṣid ashsharīʿa as "[…] the higher goals to which the textual authority by the obligations and the prohibitions aims at. Thereby, the subordinate regulations (al-aḥkām al-juzʾīya) aim to achieve these higher goals in the life of the addressees, whether individuals, families, communities or the entire community."
51 From his point of view, there is no Islamic ruling, which has not been decided in order to implement a maṣlaḥa for the human beings or to protect them from harm. All Islamic instructions are purposive in nature. The entire Islamic legislation serves one soon or later occurring maṣlaḥa. With the term maṣlaḥa, al-Qaraḍāwī does not only mean a maṣlaḥa of worldly or material nature, but he also includes the common good of human beings in the hereafter. The Islamic regulations consider the life of the human in his bodily and spiritual existence. They ensure a balance between national and international interests as well. In this regard, he writes: "The aim of the Sharia is to protect and maintain the interests of human beings in this world and the next."
52 Accordingly, al-Qaraḍāwī only takes up the ideas of earlier scholars such as al-Ghazālī, as seen above, and the Hanbali jurist Ibn Qayyim al-Jauzīya (d. 1350), but not the detailed content of their theory. The latter summarized his position as follows: "The fundamentals and principles of the Sharia aim at the good of human beings in this life and the next. They all are based on justice, mercy, the good of man and wisdom […] ." 53 It is obvious that al-Qaraḍāwī cites in his writings on maqāṣid and depends on jurists from the late medieval period such as al-Ghazālī, ash-Shāṭibī, Ibn Qayyim and Njm ad-Dīn aṭ-Ṭūfī.
54 But, he also refers to contemporary maqāṣid studies of modern thinkers such as Rashīd Riḍā (d. 1935) and Ḥasan al-Bannā (d. 1949), especially when he tries to justify his new developed understanding of maqāṣid. With reference to al-Ghazālī's and ash-Shāṭibī's presentations of maqāṣid, he distinguishes between three types of maqāṣid: (1) Ḍarūrāt: these relates to things that are indispensable to daily and spiritual life. If these interests would not be protected and preserved, humanity would slide into corruption and degradation in this life, and would have no hope of success or reward in the next. While al-Ghazālī counts five elements into this category, which he calls aḍ-ḍarūrāt al-khams, al-Qaraḍāwī adds up the protection of honor (ʿird) to this list and refers to al-Qarāfī who firstly suggests this element to aḍ-ḍarūrāt. 55 According to al-Qaraḍāwī, the Quraʾnic sanctions (ḥudūd) have been imposed, in order to preserve these six elements. For example, the protection of life is assured by the right of retaliation for unlawful killing. Similarly, intoxicants were prohibited to protect the mind, and apostasy was forbidden to protect religion. The interests of children support the prohibition of adultery. The protection of private property demands the prohibition of theft. The protection of personal honor and dignity lies behind the prohibition of slander.
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Emphasizing the importance of aḍ-ḍarūrāt, al-Qaraḍāwī depicts the person who dies protecting one of these elements as a martyr (shahīd). He justifies this claim by prophetic sayings such as: "The person who is killed in defense of his property is a martyr and who is killed in defense of himself is a martyr and who is killed in defense of his religion is a martyr, and who is killed in defense of his wife is a martyr." 57 Referring to al-Ghazālī, he asserts that any legal system protects and maintains the interests of human beings. It preserves these necessary elements of human existence and prohibits what harms them. 58 (2) Below the rank of necessity are those maqāṣid that pertain to a human need, but do not reach the level of necessity. Referring to al-Ghazālī and ash-Shāṭibī as well, al-Qaraḍāwī presents al-ḥājāt as the second category of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa. These, in his view, support such needs and interests in order to have smooth life. If it is neglected, human beings will suffer distress and hardship (e.g. the possibility of praying while sitting or lying down). (3) The third rank of maqāṣid is occupied by matters that reach neither necessity nor need. It comprises such interests that relates to public life and the development of good character, such as the adoption of good habits and the avoidance of anti-social and selfdestructive behavior. Each of these categories complements the one above it. 51 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Dirāsa, 20. 52 Madkhal, [53] [54] [55] [56] Dirāsa, 11. 53 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jauzīya, Iʿlām al-muwaqqiʿīn ʿan rabb al-ʿālamīn. Āl Sulaimān, Abū ʿUbaida Mashhūr b. Ḥasan (ed. Madkhal, 55 and idem., 86 . See for al-Qarāfī's theory of maqāṣid Kamali, Shariʿa, 126 and Opwis, Maṣlaḥa, 133. 56 Dirāsa, 28 and idem., Madkhal, 67. 57 Madkhal, 68. 58 Al-Qaraḍāwī, Dirāsa, 138 and idem., as- Siyāsa, 88 Thus, the lowest category of interests, those that improve a situation, complements the second category, those that relieve a burden, and these in turn complement the highest category, those that insure something vital. 59 AlQaraḍāwī, then, asks whether the maqāṣid can be defined in a different way from previous scholars such as alGhazālī, ash-Shāṭibī and al-Qarāfī. Indeed, he answers. With regard to modern scholars such as Rashīd Riḍā in his book The Muhammadan Revelation (al-waḥī al-muḥammadī) , he justifies the renewability of maqāṣid ashsharīʿa. According to his presentation, Riḍā speaks of the objectives of the Qurʾān and adds new maqāṣid such as promoting science; working for peace and fighting corruption; liberation of slaves and granting women all their rights. 60 On this basis, al-Qaraḍāwī appeals the extension of the traditional classification of maqāṣid, mentioned above. It depicts, he argues, the result of the work of scholars whose concerns were primarily about the individuals rather than about the community and human beings. This established notion of maqāṣid does not, so al-Qaraḍāwī says, comprise a lot of issues such as human relationships, state systems or the most universal and basic values such as solidarity (takāful) human rights (ḥuqūq al-insān), justice (ʿadāla), brotherhood (ikhāʾ), freedom (ḥurīya) and equality (musāwāt). Thus, he evaluates these values as maqāṣid ḍarūrīya und legitimizes his view with Qurʾānic and prophetic references. He lists inter alia sura 6 verse 152: "And give full measure and weight in justice. We do not charge any soul except [with that within] its capacity. And when you testify, be just, even if [it concerns] a near relative. And the covenant of God fulfill. This has He instructed you that you may remember." and sura 16 verse 90: "Indeed, God orders justice and good conduct and giving to relatives and forbids immorality and bad conduct and oppression. He admonishes you that perhaps you will be reminded." 61 The discussion of al-Qaraḍāwī's understanding of maqāsid has not yet been finished. In his treatise Madkhal limaʿrifat al-Islām ("Introduction to Islam"), he presents six aspects of Islam and declares them as "guiding purposes or aims of Islam" (maqāṣid au ahdāf asāsīya li-l-islām). 62 He puts these objectives at the same place of relevance as the five universal elements (aḍ-ḍarūrāt al-khams) developed by al-Ghazālī. 63 These six goals go initially back to his "ideological father" Ḥasan al-Bannā who has discussed these aspects in his complete works (majmūʿat rasāʾil al-imām). 64 Al-Qaraḍāwī joined the Muslim Brotherhood, founded by al-Bannā in 1928 in Egypt, in his teenage years. He was according to his presentation very impressed by al-Bannā, his words and personality in general. 65 To date, he is still regarded as a leading figure and the "spiritual father" of the Muslim Brotherhood, even if he officially since the early 1960s has declared his independence of all religious movements, legal, theological schools and political institutions. 66 In the following, I briefly introduce these six goals of Islam according to al-Qaraḍāwī's presentation. First, he discusses the construction of a righteous man (bināʾ al-insān aṣ-ṣāliḥ). According to him, the first aim of Islam is to establish a righteous man, who is capable of being God's vicegerent (khalīfa) on earth; this is man whom God has molded in the nicest form and dispensed all that is in the heavens and the earth for him. Al-Qaraḍāwī describes extensively the criteria of a religious Muslim. He represents inter alia the faith and belief (īmān wa ʿaqīda), the rites and worship (nusuk wa ʿibādāt) as well as the good character and virtue (khuluq wa-faḍīla) as the crucial guidelines for the development of the aspired Muslim.
A Muslim is for al-Qaraḍāwī a man of faith and belief, as man of rites and devotion; he is an embodiment of the virtues of justice, mercy and good influence. 68 An insān ṣāliḥ builds in al-Qaraḍāwī's thought the first objective of Islam, because "such a man is the foundation of the good home, the society, the good nation." 69 Second, the purpose of Islam that al-Qaraḍāwī mentions is "the construction of righteous family" (bināʾ al-usrah aṣ-ṣāliḥa). 70 According to him, it is necessary to build a Muslim family which lays the foundation stone of the Muslim community (umma). 71 In this context, he underlines the obligation of marriage as a starting point of a good family. 72 He further introduces the characteristic and framework of Islamic marriage as well as the mutual rights and obligations of the married couple (which cannot be explained in detail here). 73 In the third place, he presents "the establishment of the righteous society" (bināʾ al-mujtamaʿ aṣ-ṣāliḥ). Since all of these purposes of Islam are in al-Qaraḍāwī's understanding interdependent and interrelated, he claims that the construction of a good person and a good family are the basic conditions of the foundation of the Muslim society. 74 In this context, he points out the importance of Islamic values (qiyam islāmīya) for building almujtamaʿ aṣ-ṣāliḥ: "The righteous society is the one which ties the individual with his family, with the noble values of Islam, and its commendable principles making them the mission of life and the center of its existence." 75 The main principal values he mentions in this regard are: brotherhood (ikhāʾ); kindness (tarāḥum), solidarity (taḍāmun) and justice (ʿaḍāla). 76 Al-Qaraḍāwī goes on to present the fourth goal of Islam, which is concerned with the "establishment of a righteous community" (bināʾ al-umma aṣ-ṣāliḥa) . 77 This umma, community, which is considered as "one of the elementary purposes of Islam […] has to carry out its mission and base its life on its faith and its laws etc. It shall raise its generations along the right path [of Islam], and spread its mission all over the world […] ." 78 In this regard, al-Qaraḍāwī underlines repeatedly the importance of daʿwa ("mission") and requires that Muslims should improve their language skills as well as the strategy of the missionary work to be able to call everyone in their own language and in accordance with their habits of thinking. He writes: "It is obligatory for the Islamic community to invite all people to Islam in their own tongues in order to explain to them [Islam] and to prove the argument to them." 79 He further argues that the mission of Islam is universal: for all races, colors, all regions, all communities, all languages and all classes. He often refers to the following Qurʾānic verse to support his argument: "And We have not sent you, [O Muhammad] , except as a mercy to the worlds." 80 The fifth objective of Islam al-Qaraḍāwī deals with is "the establishment of righteous state" (bināʾ ad-dawla aṣ-ṣāliḥa). This ambition is, in his view, logical and legal, exactly as the Qurʾān appeals to build the good individual, righteous family and the establishing of the Islamic community. According to this notion, it is of essential relevance for the umma having an Islamic state to achieve its goals, safeguard its mission in and outside of the Islamic territory. 81 He further claims, that the idea of an Islamic state is not an invention created or disclosed by himself or by any Islamic movement. Rather, it is sanctioned clearly in the divine texts of Islam, in the Qurʾān and the Sunna, and confirmed historically as well. Supporting this claim, he lists inter alia verses 4:58 and 59.
In short, he understands these two verses as proof that Muslims should have an Islamic state: "This hopeful and desirable state is an Islamic necessity, and it is also a human necessity, because it will offer humanity a living example of the combination of religion and the world […] and it will be the foundation stone for the establishment of the great state of Islam, which shall unite the Muslim nation under the banner of the Qurʾān, under the domain of the Caliphate of Islam.
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Although al-Qaraḍāwī speaks elaborately of the umma and of an Islamic state, he, however, does not clearly define what he exactly means by that. A number of questions remain in this context unanswered, such as when should this aspired state be established? How big should it be and who is in it or excluded from it? These are open questions. He continues with the sixth and last objective of Islam. It is according to his presentation "the invitation to the prosperity of humanity" (ad-daʿwa ilā khair al-insānīya) . This is what he sees in the call for and acceptance of Islam. He describes the missionary work at this point as the first and most important duty for the umma. To paraphrase his own words, the umma is in the first place a community with a message sent with the Prophet to all human beings. Since the beginning of the mission of Islam, the message universal, and a call to all mankind, a mercy to all people, Arab or non-Arab, in both East and West, to all colors, white or black. In respect of maṣlaḥa mursala, al-Qaraḍāwī embraces al-Ghazālī's and ash-Shāṭibī's approaches to the principle of maṣlaḥa. Based on al-Ghazālī's presentation, he distinguishes between three kinds of maṣāliḥ as well: accredited public interest (maṣlaḥa muʿtabara), nullified public interest (maṣlaḥa mulghāh) and textually unregulated public interest (maṣlaḥā mursala). 85 The three conditions of necessity, universality and certainty that al-Ghazālī mentioned imply in al-Qaraḍāwī's point of view al-Ghazālī's rejection of maṣlaḥa mursala as a normative legal instrument in Islamic law. They are very stringent and hard to meet, he argues. 86 In contrast to alGhazālī and with reference to ash-Shāṭibī, al-Qaraḍāwī suggests the validity of maṣlaḥa mursala as a source of Islamic law when it is real (ḥaqīqīya) and not specious (wahmīya); acceptable for the common sense (maʿqūla); in accordance with the high objectives of the Sharia and preserves a definitive interest (ḍarūrīya) or removes a distress (rafʿ ḥaraj). 87 Al-Qraḍāwī affirms, contrary to al-Ghazālī, that the maṣlaḥa mursala must not be necessary (ḍarūrīya), universal (kullīya) and certain (qaṭʿīya) to be legitimately used for legal rulings. It has to be just factual (ḥaqīqīya). The question of what criteria can determine that a maṣlaḥa is recognized as ḥaqīqīya remains unanswered by al-Qaraḍāwī. He only warns in general terms against taking legal decisions based on arbitrariness or justified by personal whims and preferences (manfaʿa khāṣṣa). Relying on the maṣlaḥa mursala does not mean according to his understanding that legal opinions can be given random answers and according to personal inclinations and desires. Making a legal decision on the basis of a maṣlaḥa mursala has to be very cautiously reviewed. 88 Pertaining to the collision of a definitive scriptural ruling with a nullified or unattested public interest, al-Qaraḍāwī underlines that the texts cannot be suspended by virtue of a maṣlaḥa unless the maṣlaḥa is certain (qaṭʿīya) and essential to preserve a binding objective of Sharia at the ḍarūrāt level. As an example, he mentions the above illustrated war scenario presented by al-Ghazālī. 89 In this correlation, alQaraḍāwī discusses the question when there are conflicting public interests.
All-Seer. O you who believe! Obey God and obey the Messenger (Muhammad and those of you (Muslims) who are in authority. (And) if you differ in anything amongst yourselves, refer it to God and His Messenger (Muḥammad), if you believe in God and in the Last Day. That is better and more suitable for final determination." (an-Nisāʾ 4:58 and 59). The first verse is, according to his interpretation, addressed to the Muslim guardians and rulers. They have to rule with justice full respect for human rights. The second verse is directed to the faithful followers. They should obey their rulers on the condition that the obedience comes after obedience to God and His Prophet and instructed that in the case of disputes, the matter be referred to God and His Prophet, that are the Qurʾān and the Sunna. He further arguers, that Ibn Taimīya wrote his well-known book as-Siyāsa ash-sharʿīya fī iṣlāḥ ar-rāʿī wa-r-raʿīya ("The Policy of the Sharia in the Interest of the Leader and subjects") based on these tow verses. See Ibid., 260. 83 Ibid., 268. 84 Ibid., 270. 85 84 and for more details see El-Wereny, Das Konzept, 87. 86 Ibid., 99. 87 Ibid., vol. 3, [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] Al-Qaraḍāwī, Naḥwa fiqh muyyassar, 86-87. 89 Al-Qaraḍāwī, as-Siyāsa, 158.
He states that Muftis should first attempt to reach a compromise. If this is not possible it assigns priorities: The general interest or public welfare takes precedence over the particular or the personal well-being and avoiding harm is preferable to gaining an advantage. The same principle should be applied to choose a lesser harm to avoid what is worse. 
Conclusion
The concept of maqāṣid ash-sharīʿa rests basically on the idea that all Islamic provisions uphold particular purposes. From an Islamic point of view, God aims with all of his commandments and prohibitions to promote people's interest and protect them from harm. This approach, as a juridical term justifying legal decisions, has given rise to numerous debates since it was used. Throughout Islamic history, Muslim scholars have identified several and different maqāṣid. Al-Ghazālī as the first theoretician who systematically dealt with maqāṣid or maṣāliḥ ash-sharīʿa speaks of three ranks (ḍarūrāt, ḥājāt and taḥsīnāt) and five necessary objectives of the Sharia. Other scholars adopted his concept, added new objectives and formulated legal decisions in the light of this notion.
Al-Qaraḍāwī understands maqāṣid or maṣāliḥ primarily as a system of values that should contribute to his desired application of the Sharia, based on the conviction that all Sharia rules are valid for every time and at every place. He recalls, taking up the ideas of al-Ghazālī, ash-Shāṭibī as well as of Ibn Qayyim, that all divine rules found on the Qurʾān or the Sunna are in accordance with the good and interest of human beings. Although he frequently quotes al-Ghazālī's concept of maqāṣid, he does not blindly follow it. With reference to other scholars and modern thinkers, such as ash-Shaṭibī and Riḍā, he broadens the scope of the five traditional maqāṣid and adds new elements which include modern issues such as human dignity, justice and freedom etc. In addition, he declares the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood, adopted from its founder, al-Bannā, as further maqāṣid of Islam. In this context, al-Qaraḍāwī does not constitute an exception. Other modern and contemporary scholars have also added new maqāṣid to the traditional inherited concept. For example, the Tunisian scholar Ibn ʿĀshūr (d. 1973) included in his study of maqāsid ash-sharīʿa new values such as tolerance, equality, freedom, and orderliness as part of the universal maqāṣid of Islamic law.
91 Ṭāhā Jābir Al-ʿAlwānī, an Islamic scholar and former president of International Institute of Islamic Thought (d. 2016) , suggests new maqāṣid as well, such as the concept of developing civilization on earth (ʿimrān).
92 It can therefore be concluded that maqāṣid or maṣāliḥ ash-sharīʿa can be understood in al-Qaradawi's judgment, as a flexible principle that is interpreted anew in harmony with the historical and geographical context. The main criteria are, as seen in al-Qaraḍāwī's presentation, the supporting evidences of the Qurʾān and/or the Sunna. This gives, nonetheless, rise to another question: according to which criteria or hermeneutical methods can or should such Qurʾānic or prophetic proofs be interpreted to decide on adding new maqāṣid?
The same can be said about the application of maṣlaḥa al-mursala. It provides Muftis and scholars the ability, based on their own efforts and reasoning and in the light of current living circumstances, to give legal decisions. In order to avoid misinterpretations or arbitrariness dealing with this kind of maṣlaḥa, al-Ghazālī -as explaineddefines three conditions (necessary, certain and universal) for its use as a legal reference. Al-Qaraḍāwī regards these preconditions as difficult to meet and attempts to simplify its use removing al-Ghazālī's conditions. Therefore, he argues, giving a fatwā referring to a textually unregulated interest requires only that the maṣlaḥa is authentic (haqīqīya), that is in accord with the objectives of the Sharia and that the formulation of an injunction will avoid a general difficulty. Thus, a maṣlaḥa mursala must not be kullīya, ḍarūrīya and qaṭʿīya, as al-Ghazālī mentions. Nonetheless, it remains unclear how can a maṣlaḥa mursala be defined as real or not. Such a broad scope introduced by al-Qaraḍāwī might show the renewability and the flexibility of a part of uṣul al-fiqh. However, it still gives rise to the risk of arbitrariness giving legal decisions without reference to the Qurʾān or the Sunna; only on the basis of rational and completely free reasoning, all to protect the common good or to remove hardship. Against this background, there is still a considerable lack of clarity in the way maṣlaḥa mursala can be applied. In my opinion, this gap cannot be closed, because the public interests are continuously changeable depending on their context, which are always variable. 90 Madkhal, 60. 
